Imitation or innovation? Unselective mixed strategies can provide a better solution.
Current theory about the evolution of social learning in a changing environment predicts the emergence of mixed strategies that rely on some selective combination of social and asocial learning. However, the results of a recent tournament of social learning strategies [Rendell et al. Science 328(5975):208-213, 2010] suggest that the success relies almost entirely on copying to learn behavior. Those authors conclude that mixed strategies are vulnerable to invasion by individuals using social learning strategies alone. Here we perform a competition using unselective strategies that differ only in the degree of social versus asocial learning. We show that, under the same conditions of the aforementioned tournament, a pure social learning strategy can be invaded by an unselectively mixed strategy and attain an equilibrium where the latter is majority. Although existing theory suggests that copying other individuals unselectively is not adaptive, we show that, at this equilibrium, the average individual fitness of the population is higher than for a population of pure asocial learners, overcoming Rogers' paradox in finite populations.